The application of propositional and predicate calculus in mathematical systems is very well known. The truth-functional application has been fundamental to the computational systems with widespread application in the sciences and engineering. Further, a computational theory of mind which suggests that computation equates to consciousness has become a common argument in cognitive psychology and in evolutionary psychology.
Criticism of the theory’s inability to provide a sufficient proof of intentionality become testable with the relative capacity (and inability in the realm of artificial intelligence) for the formation of new shared symbolic values. Retracing this issue through the motivational differences between descriptive and normative statements provides both an understanding of the supposed problem of consciousness, but also a grounding for moral values, which can be further elaborated into universal pragmatics through rational reconstruction. Such a grounding provides no less than the prospect of a propositional and predicate calculus of a universal moral theory, ‘more human than human’, a transhumanism which may be misunderstood as inhuman compared to the developmental limitations within the species. In addition this ontologically independent moral realism will also retain problematic elements of propositional and predicate calculus, along with serious issues concerning incommensurability between the different systems of verification.
By Lev Lafayette